Conduct Unbecoming

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“Loose Talk Could Sink This Ship”

“The Walls Have Ears”

The above are among reminders you would normally see then in a military establishment. Whether or not these reminders are being repeated today remains to be answered. At least such reminders should be repeated in all courses attended by military personnel.

Back in the 1970s, at the height of the Second Emergency, soldiers got killed after wives talked eagerly in public about the husbands going for operations against communist terrorists. Mind you, wives and children are the only people in any military establishment that are never vetted by security agencies.

One such wife was even employed as a typist at one military establishment. For years she mailed the carbon papers of each important military correspondence to the intelligence service of a neighbouring country before she was arrested.

In the late 1980s, 10 officers and men of the Armed Forces were nabbed by military intelligence after they were found to have sold strategic defence files to the intelligence agencies of a neighbouring country. The highest amount paid for a file was USD96,000 for a document on contingency defence plans of a particular state. The rest were defence plans of an Air Force Base, a naval base, and the layout of a military hospital.

In the Armed Forces too you have channels to complain or air your grouses. Your quarters is leaking, you complain to the Facilities Officer. Your mess food sucks, you complain to the Mess Messing Member, or in the case of the other ranks (rank and file if you must), complain to the Duty Officer who is supposed to eat the food you eat with you. Your senior officer has wronged you, the Armed Forces Act, 1972 allows you to seek redress of wrong. Your indelible ink wears off your finger in less than a day, you complain to the Officer Commanding the Administration Branch. Better still, if it is on the same day of voting, you complain to the Elections Commission officers at your place of voting.

There is a reason that you are an Armed Forces member and not a civilian. It means that you are not a civilian. You come from a highly disciplined institution that lives by its codes of rules, regulations, standing orders and orders. You cannot whine like an old lady in public, more so when you are in uniform.

Former Major Zaidi bin Ahmad was a good officer, until the day he appeared in the photo above. He was my junior by two intakes. He was a good pilot. He flew the F-5E Tiger II before progressing to a F-18 Hornet driver, after which he was picked to lead No.12 Squadron (F-5E Tiger II) as its Commanding Officer. He was a quiet man, well-mannered, and according to those who know him, it was no secret that he is a staunch supporter of PAS.

There is nothing about being a military man and have a liking for whichever political party. When I was a serving officer, I told my men that they were free to vote for anyone they wished, but as a member of His Majesty’s Air Force, they should remain apolitical in their conduct.

Granted that Zaidi might have had good intention by talking about his experience with the indelible ink, he went against the Armed Forces Council’s Order No. 13 of 1960. What more, he was wearing his uniform. As a member of the Armed Forces, you are not to talk to the media unless you have prior clearance from the Public Relations Office at both the Air Force HQ and the Ministry of Defence. You might be subjected to unguided and mischievous questions and you might answer wrongly. You might give away more than you should, as the information you are privy to may cause harm to the defence of the nation if leaked whether intentionally or unintentionally.

After the episode above, he was under investigation I presume, and an orders signal was issued for him to be transferred to a lesser sensitive post pending investigation. Each signal (in the civilian world before the advent of the E-Mail is much like the telegram) is either an unclassified document (Pendarjahan TERBUKA), or RESTRICTED and above (Pendarjahan TERHAD ke atas). I would expect the signal pertaining to his transfer was classified as PERSONNEL-IN-CONFIDENCE (SULIT DARIHAL ANGGOTA).

A transfer is normal when one is under investigation. Policemen under investigation are always transferred to “desk” duties. The same applied to Zaidi. Instead, perhaps for political reasons, he decided to show the signal to journalists who do not have the necessary security clearance to be privy to the information on the signal.

One might argue that a transfer order is hardly detrimental to the security of the nation. Well, in this case, maybe it wasn’t. It is not so much the content that is in question but the act of showing any document to those unauthorised to view it. Imagine if his grouses are bigger, I cannot imagine what a Commanding Officer of a fighter squadron, charged with taking care of the nation’s defence, could and would reveal to unauthorised people. That act, to me, shows how this senior officer’s conduct was very unbecoming, and is not trustworthy to be looking after the nation’s defence.  To add insult to injury, Zaidi even sent out an SMS in the form of a political incitement; definitely unbecoming of a senior officer of the Armed Forces.

Was the punishment of being discharged from His Majesty’s service received by Zaidi harsh? My answer is a definite no. Firstly, Zaidi was a senior officer and a Commanding Officer. He was not some less-educated Private or Airman. He was charged under Section 50 (2) and Section 51 of the Armed Forces Act, 1972, for disobedience to superior officer and disobedience to standing orders.

If I may read to you the punishments prescribed by these sections. They read:

Every person subject to service law under this Act who, whether wilfully or through neglect, disobeys ny lawful command of his superior officer/standing orders shall, on conviction by court-martial, be liable to imprisonment or any less punishment provided by this Act.

The scale of punishments for an Officer of the Armed Forces prescribed by the Armed Forces Act, 1972, can be found in Section 89 (2) of the Act. They are:

Death,

Imprisonment to a term not exceeding 14 years,

Dismissal with disgrace from His Majesty’s service,

Dismissal from His Majesty’s service,

Forfeiture of seniority of rank,

Dismissal of an officer from the ship he belongs to,

Fine,

Severe reprimand,

Reprimand,

In the occasion of expense, damage, or loss, stoppages.

In the case of Zaidi’s, the gravity of his offences and his rank and position make only the first four punishments applicable to him.  However, since the death punishment is out of the question, the members of the Court-Martial chose the least: dismissal from His Majesty’s service, meaning that he is still entitled to his benefits.

Is that harsh? Not at all. There have been officers dismissed for lesser offences. Examplary? Yes. And very necessary.

Zaidi no doubt was a good guy. However, his political beliefs led him to do what every officer and man of His Majesty’s Armed Forces should not do: disobey orders and putting the uniform you wear to shame. A King’s Officer does not whine about his grouses in public like a yeast-infected aunt. He should live the organised life of his organisation instead of abusing his uniform for his own benefit. There were channels he could have gone through but no. He thought he knew best and in doing so he did injustice to his family.

He is now a political celebrity, a nicer way to call a donkey in politics. He will now be part of a circus act and may earn a bit from the collection made from the spectators of the nightly circus shows he will be performing in, all in the misguided name of justice. Once the next general elections is over, we hope he would have found a steady job by then.

 

Air Power Is National Power – An Essay

This article was submitted to the RMAF PR Department after Defence writer, Danny Liew asked me if I was participating in the essay-writing contest (that I had no idea about). I quickly wrote one in office and mailed it within 2 hours of writing. I could not write much as we were limited to 2,000 words only (if I remember correctly).

It only won a consolation prize (not surprised though due to the lack of effort I made)

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AIR POWER IS NATIONAL POWER

Background
For most of its beginnings, the RMAF operated in support of the Malaysian Army’s and Royal Malaysian Navy’s operations, before finally gaining air defence capabilities in 1963 after receiving ten ex-RAAF CAC Sabre fighters. 56 years after its establishment and in spite of recent unfair criticisms for its mainly misguided and perceived roles, the RMAF is, still without doubt, a force to be reckoned with.

Operating uniquely a combination of modern European, American and Russian aircraft, the RMAF has a power projection that had gotten a regional neighbour publish a defence white paper to discuss what is believed to be “the first nation to have the capability to strike the mainland in sixty years.” Supported by very capable air defence coverage as well as skilled personnel, the RMAF continues to provide assurance that the sovereignty of the nation will be protected at all costs.

However, does the RMAF have enough appropriate assets to truly assert power projection?

Force Projection– Lessons from the Ambalat and Lahad Datu Incidents

“Force Projection” is a term used to describe a nation’s ability to project power and exert influence on its neighbours at the least, and viably regionally or globally.

During the Ambalat incidents from February through May 2005 saw the RMAF deploying some of its assets from the Peninsula to the East. Given the number of offensive air assets the RMAF possesses, had the conflict gone uncontrolled, it would have been a daunting task to defend both sides of the nation.

We again see a deployment of assets from the Peninsula during Ops Daulat to provide close air support for the ground combatants. The RMAF has been continuously been rotating aircraft on detachments from the Peninsula and this is far from being a feasible way of sustaining force projection.

Air Power

The British definition of air power today is:

“The ability to project military force in air or space by or from a platform or missile operating above the surface of the earth. Air platforms are defined as any aircraft, helicopter or unmanned air vehicles.”

The above defines the characteristics of modern air power which provides for national deterrence against possible belligerents. The manner in which the RMAF operations are limited to does not allow for sustainable air power projection.

The factors that define effective implementation of air power include:

Airbases. There should be a network of permanent as well as alternative operating bases. Although much of the grass airstrips in Malaysia have been converted into dwelling as well as golf courses, we are still blessed with myriad small airstrips that can effectively operate smaller aircraft suitable for light-attack and helo operations. Civilian airports in Sabah and Sarawak in particular should provide the opportunity for the RMAF to form and house additional squadrons instead of detachments from the Peninsula to effectively oversee its responsibility to provide adequate air defence for those states. While air-to-air refuelling (AAR) can extend the reach of our fighters as well as their loiter time, planning factors such as distance, demand, duration as well as cost generated by the need for enhanced AAR capability need to be taken into account.

Versatility. Our air assets should also be versatile in its multi-role capabilities with quick turnarounds for other roles reconfiguration.

Air Presence. While “Sentiasa Di Angkasaraya (Always in the Air)” may be the motto of the RMAF, it is prohibitively expensive to continuously provide air presence. Already blessed with a relatively good air defence system, and in light of the MH370 incident, the RMAF may need to tweak its air intercept procedures, provided with better engine hours for its interceptors, and impose upon the Department of Civil Aviation for better airspace management control where the former has a better control of not just suspected hostiles, but also of stray friendlies.

Fragility. As air assets grow in terms of sophistication and performance characteristics, so does those of the anti-air defences. As such, suppression of air defences becomes an important and crucial role for air power. During WW2, DeHavilland produced an aircraft that embraced simplicity in battle-damage repair but effective in performance: the almost-all-wood Mosquito. While wood is more fragile than conventional aircraft material, the fragility of the Mosquito was ameliorated by its speed and superb performance. Likewise, the RMAF would need aircraft that has better speed, low radar signature and good self-protection measures to make up for the fragility due to the enemy’s enhanced air defence capabilities. This will ensure the ability of the RMAF to penetrate deep behind enemy air defence lines.

Good intelligence and Quick Response. Air Intelligence Officers must possess the correct knowledge, attitude and the ability to grasp situations in order to have an effective support for air combat operations. As intelligence is perishable, good intelligence is only good if it can be made to good use by the tacticians and strategists before its value becomes outdated. The Decision-Action cycle has to be in a tempo that supersede that of the enemy.

Stand-Off/Reach. The range of modern air-to-air, air-to-surface weapons, as well as the air platforms that carry them will demonstrate the RMAF’s commitment and resolve. This is an area where the RMAF, in moving forward, need to seek balance in when making future procurements of air assets and materiel.

Sustainability. The RMAF must ensure that its manpower, equipment and logistics are able to command its operational and objective requirements. Sustainability is the ability to maintain its aim as prescribed in the Principles of War.

Principles of War

The Principles of War were developed by Major General JFC “Boney” Fuller based on his experiences during the First World War. Applicable also to Air Power, failure to take into account these hard-won lessons can lead to mission failure. They are:

Selection and Maintenance of the Aim. It is imperative that the aim in which the RMAF plans to achieve its objectives must be carefully selected and defined with clarity. The objectives must be attainable and directed to achieving the intended strategic goals. The commanders at all levels must know how to interpret the aim and what is required of them and the resources made available to them to attain the aim. Therefore, the tasks, roles and missions selected for the air assets must be consistent and coherent with the strategic initiatives to achieve this aim.

Maintenance of Morale. Air and ground assets employed by an air force are useless without personnel that are motivated to achieving the aim. Continual training and maintenance of discipline are equally as important for the men and women of the RMAF as well as having commanders who they can look up to and trust in their leadership in times of war and peace.

Security. It is also imperative that physical protection of assets be of utmost importance against enemy interference. All personnel need to embrace the “need-to-know” and information denial culture. For the latter to occur, good and outstanding commanders who command the respect of his/her men and women play exceptional role in maintaining their morale and in making them understand the culture of information denial.

Surprise. Surprise is essential to achieve mission success and must be applied to at all levels of RMAF activities. Surprise can be achieved through secrecy, concealment, deception, originality, audacity and speed.

Offensive Action. The commander must always employ offensive action to influence the outcome of the campaign or operation. With selection and maintenance of the aim, determination must be set to maintain the initiative and deny the enemy from overcoming the goals. In peacetime, force projection via adequate appropriate assets as well as the availability of correct basing of assets provides psychological offensive action. Hence, the Government needs to see that resources are made available to the RMAF to achieve this aim.

Concentration of Force. It is essential to concentrate superior force against the enemy at the decisive time and place which calls for superior and adequate assets, as well as quick reaction to good intelligence to achieve success in war and peacetime.

Economy of Effort. Decisive strength must be achieved and maintained in order to have concentration of force. Therefore, Economy of Effort demands correct air power weapons and delivery systems to match the tasks.

Flexibility. Flexibility allows the commander to exercise judgment by modifying plans without changing the aim. It demands trust, discipline, good training and quick decision-making.

Cooperation. Better cooperation and coordination with other services can be achieved through joint exercises. This allows for concentration of force and economy of effort against the enemy.

Sustainability. As mentioned, sustainability is about maintaining the physical, spiritual and moral aspects, and the necessary fighting power of the RMAF. Without sustainability, the aim will be greatly jeopardised.

Conclusion

Air Power is important in maintaining the nation’s deterrence from belligerence. The RMAF needs the government’s support in acquiring adequate appropriate assets to maintain that deterrence as it projects the nation’s power.